In this paper we study a class of infinite horizon optimal control problems with incentive constraints in the discrete time case. More specifically, we establish sufficient conditions under which the value function associated to such problems satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle.
Introduction
In this paper we study a family of discrete time deterministic dynamic optimization problems with an infinite horizon and an incentive compatibility constraint, which, in the sequel, will be called incentive constrained problemsor ICP for short. These problems (see Section 2 for the detailed formulation) are classical infinite horizon optimal control problems with a constraint on the continuation value of the plan. The continuation value at any current date t must be larger than some prescribed function of the current state and of the current control.
ICP arise in many economic applications 1 (see e.g. [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] for the discrete time case, and [1] , [7] for the continuous time case). ICP are not easily manageable due to the specific nature of the incentive constraint. Indeed, such a constraint concerns the future of the strategies, differently than the more commonly used constraints, which appear in standard dynamic optimization problems and concern the states of the system or the range of the admissible controls. For this reason, in general, the Dynamic Programming (DP) approach is not exploitable. Therefore, with standard terminology (see e.g. in [3] , [6] ), the contract is said to be not recursive.
In [3] a method is proposed to deal with incentive constrained problems in discrete time (deterministic or stochastic) when DP method may not be applied. This method is based on the introduction of a new set of variables, the so-called dual variables, that still allows to solve the problem in a recursive way. This result seems to be very useful in the general case, though we see two possible restraints:
• strong regularity and boundedness assumptions are needed on the data;
• the new problem to solve is more complex than the original one.
These two points call for a question: although DP approach cannot be exploited in general, is it possible to determine a class of incentive constrained problems such that the DP procedure turns out to be successful? For this class there would be two advantages, related with the two limitations described above:
• weaker assumptions on the data;
• not increasing of the complexity of the original problem.
Towards this direction we are aware of two results in the recent literature (see [4] and [1] ) that show the applicability of DP approach to a class of ICP, under the assumption that the incentive running objective is equal to the running objective of the maximizing agent. More precisely, [4] deals with a general discrete time case, and [1] is concerned with the deterministic case in continuous time.
In this paper, we aim to extend the domain of applicability of DP approach to a larger class of ICP, though dealing only with the discrete deterministic case. This is just our preliminary step to tackle the discrete stochastic case and the continuous time cases. Our main result is that the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP), formally the equation
where
is an admissible set of controls associated to the initial point x, holds true under a suitable comonotonicity assumption introduced and explained in Section 2. The paper has the following structure: in Section 2 we formulate the problem (see 3); in Section 3 we prove DPP (1) for ICP problems via two Lemmas, which are related to some properties of the trajectories: stability under shift (SS) (see Lemma 4) and stability under concatenation (SC) (see Lemma 6).
2 Incentive constrained problems in the discretetime deterministic case
We first give a general formulation
The general model
Let (x t ) t∈N be a controlled discrete-time stationary dynamical system with states in the real Euclidean space R n . Given a map f : R n × R m → R n , the transition function of the dynamical system, a nonempty subset X 0 of R n , the state constraint on the dynamical system, and a nonempty-valued correspondence Γ : R n → P(R m ), the technological constraint on the control, we assume that (x t ) t∈N is subject to the difference equation
where x is the initial state of the dynamical system, and (c t ) t∈N is a discretetime control process such that c t ∈ Γ(x t ) and f (x t , c t ) ∈ X 0 , for every t ∈ N. Such a process (c t ) t∈N is called an admissible control for the dynamical system with initial state x. We denote by C(x) the set of all admissible control processes with initial state x and we write x t (x, c) for the solution of (2) corresponding to the choice of a specific control process c ≡ (c t ) t∈N in C(x). Since in this paper we are not concerned in dealing with the minimal hypotheses that assure the existence of solutions of (2), we assume straightforwardly that for every x ∈ X 0 the set C(x) is nonempty.
Given a function r : R n × R m → R, the running objective, and β ∈ (0, 1), the discount factor, for any x ∈ X 0 and any c ∈ C(x), we introduce the objective functional
Then, the standard optimization problem for the functional J r : X 0 × C(x) → R is to compute the value function V 0 : X 0 →R, whereR ≡ R∪{−∞, +∞} stands for the extended Euclidean real line, given by
and, possibly, to determine an optimal control c * ∈ C(x) such that
for every x ∈ X 0 . Now, given the functions g 1 : R n ×R m → R, the initial incentive constraint, and g 2 : R n × R m → R, the running incentive constraint, and given N ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, for any x ∈ X 0 , we introduce the set C g (x) of all controls c ∈ C(x) fulfilling the incentive constraint
We assume that the set X ≡ {x ∈ X 0 | C g (x) = ∅} is nonempty 2 . The incentive constraint problem for the functional J r : X × C g (x) → R is to compute the value function V : X →R given by
and, possibly, to determine an optimal control c * ∈ C g (x) such that
for every x ∈ X. In the sequel, for simplicity, we set
and
for every N ∈ N, and h = 1, ..., N .
Main Assumptions and statement of DPP
To tackle the constrained optimization problem (4) via DP approach, we begin by assuming that:
This is clearly a restriction and sometimes one would like to consider problems where V may be infinite. On the other hand, the latter case is not considered in most of the quoted papers treating ICP. We formulate this assumption for sake of simplicity. Indeed, sometimes the finiteness of V arises from compactness, some other times by boundedness, other times again by suitable state-control constraints. In this general part, the treatment of all these different topics would result in useless technical complications.
Having assumed the finiteness of the value function, we still need to introduce the following hypothesis on the structure of the family of all admissible controls, which will turn out to be crucial to exploit a DP approach to ICP.
Assumption 2 For any c ∈ C g (x), any T > 0, and any ε > 0 there exists a ε-optimal control at x T (x, c), denoted by c ε , such that either
in the case N = +∞; or 2.
where c T is the control at x T (x, c) given by
Assumption 2 calls for some comment. First, we remember that c ε is an ε-optimal control at x T (x, c) when
The possibility of finding an ε-optimal control is assured by the finiteness of the value function. The relevance of Assumption 2 is then the requirement that there exists at least one of such controls fulfilling also either 1 or 2. Second, observe that, as required by 1 and 2, the control c T actually belongs to x, c) ). This will be shown in subsequent Lemma 4. Third, Assumption 2 may be seen as an hypothesis of comonotonicity of the functionals J g 2 (x; ·) (or J h g 2 (x; ·)) with respect to J r (x; ·). 3 Actually, if this is the case, 1 and 2 clearly hold true. This has a plain economic explanation. Our "comonotonicity" means that the running objectives r and g 2 are compatible. This compatibility means that the social planner and the agent maximizing J g2 (x; ·) (or J h g2 (x; ·)) and J r (x; ·) have the same structure of preferences along optimal (or almost optimal) strategies. In this case, the incentive does not affect the recursivity.
Finally, we note that Assumption 2 is satisfied in [4] and [1] , where g 2 = r.
We are now in a position to state DP approach to our ICP.
Theorem 3
For any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C g (x), and any T ∈ N, write
Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have
J r,T (x; c) .
The proof is obtained by considering the two inequalities shown in Propositions 5 and 7.
Dynamic Programming: statement and proof
The main idea beyond our result is the following (contained also "in nuce" in [1, Section 3]).
The classical proof of the Dynamic Programming Principle (1) depends on two key properties of the family of the sets of admissible strategies {C g (x)} x∈X 3 The functional Jg 2 (x; ·) is comonotone with respect to Jr(x; ·) when for all controls c 1 , c 2 
Clearly, the same holds for J h
The first one is the "stability under shift" (SS), while the second is the "stability under concatenation" (SC). Property (SS) states that c ∈ C g (x) implies c T ∈ C g (x T (x, c)). Starting with an admissible control c at t = 0 from x 0 = x, shifting it at T then c T is admissible starting at t = 0 from x 0 = x T (x, c). Even in cases more general than ours, (SS) is true as it is shown in Lemma 4 and it yields the inequality ≤ in (1). This is proved in Subsection 3.1.
Property (SC) states that picking two admissible controls c ∈ C g (x) and c ∈ C g (x T (x, c)) then the controlc given bỹ
belongs to C g (x), hence the concatenated controlc is admissible starting at t = 0 from x 0 = x. Unfortunately, even in simple cases (SC) is not true. Of course, the failure of (SC) does not mean that DP principle is false since (SC) is a sufficient condition. In Subsection 3.2 we show (see Lemma 6) that (SC) holds ifĉ is "better" than c along the functional J g2 . This is done by analyzing the family {C g (x)} x∈X . Given this fact, the inequality ≥ is an easy consequence of Assumption 2.
In next two subsection we consider the two inequalities separately
The easy inequality
We begin by proving the above mentioned Property (SS).
Lemma 4
For any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C g (x), and any T > 0, the control c T given by c
Proof. Since the transition function f : R n × R m → R n of the dynamical system is stationary, for any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C(x), and any T > 0, we clearly have
for every t ∈ N. Hence, c T ∈ C(x T (x, c)). Assuming in addition c ∈ C g (x), we have also
for every s ∈ N. Thus, setting s ≡ t + T , it follows
for every t ∈ N. Therefore, on account of (8) and of the definition of c T , we obtain
which completes the proof.
¿From (SS) it easily follows
Proposition 5 For any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C g (x), and any T ∈ N we have
Proof. To prove (9), it is sufficient to observe that, for every ε > 0, there exists c ε ∈ C g (x) such that
On the other hand, on account of Lemma 4, for any T ∈ N, we can write
Combining (10) and (11), it then follows
and the latter clearly implies the desired (9).
The hard inequality
Now, we prove Property (SC)
Lemma 6
For any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C g (x) and any T > 0, letĉ ∈ C g (x T (x, c)) satisfying either the condition
in the case N = +∞, or the condition
in the case N < +∞. Then the controlc given bỹ
belongs to C g (x).
Proof. For any x ∈ X, any c ∈ C g (x) and any T > 0, by (14), we have
Hence,c ∈ C(x). Thus, to prove thatc ∈ C g (x), we are left with the task of showing that the incentive constraint (3) is satisfied for every t ≥ 0. To this task, we start by dealing with the case N = +∞. Actually, for 0 ≤ t < T , we can write
Hence, adding and subtracting the term
we obtain
On the other hand, observe that c ∈ C g (x) implies that
= β
Therefore, combining (17) and (19) with (12), thanks to (14), it follows that, for every 0 ≤ t < T ,
Finally, to complete the proof in the case N = +∞, it is sufficient to observe that, on account of (14) and (15), for every t ≥ T we have
and that x, c) ). Now, with regard to the case N ∈ N, let us observe first that for every 0 ≤ t < T − N we clearly have Finally, for t ≥ T we can argue exactly as in the case N = +∞. This completes the proof.
We are now in a position to prove
